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A Swing-Contract Market Design for Flexible
Service Provision in Electric Power Systems
Wanning Li and Leigh Tesfatsion
Abstract The need for flexible service provision in electric power systems has dra-
matically increased due to the growing penetration of variable energy resources, as
has the need to ensure fair access and compensation for this provision. A swing con-
tract facilitates flexible service provision with appropriate compensation because it
permits multiple services to be offered together in bundled form with each service
expressed as a range of possible values rather than as a single point value. This
paper discusses a new swing-contract market design for electric power systems
that permits swing contracts to be offered by any dispatchable resource. An ana-
lytical optimization formulation is developed for the clearing of a swing-contract
day-ahead market that can be implemented using any standard mixed integer lin-
ear programming solver. The practical feasibility of the optimization formulation is
demonstrated by means of a numerical example.
1 Introduction
The increased penetration of variable energy resources in electric power markets has
increased the volatility of net load (i.e., load minus non-dispatchable generation) as
well as the frequency of strong ramp events. Variable energy resources (VERs) are
renewable energy resources, such as wind and solar power, whose generation cannot
be closely controlled to match changes in load or to meet other system requirements.
Latest Revision: 2 July 2017
Wanning Li
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Coover Hall, Iowa State University, Ames,
IA 50011, e-mail: wanningl@iastate.edu
Leigh Tesfatsion (corresponding author)
Department of Economics, Heady Hall 260, Iowa State University, 518 Farm House Lane, Ames,
IA 50011-1054, e-mail: tesfatsi@iastate.edu
1
2 Wanning Li and Leigh Tesfatsion
In consequence, flexibility in ancillary service provision has become increasingly
important to maintain the reliability and efficiency of power system operations. This
has encouraged power system operators to introduce new products and market pro-
cesses designed to permit more flexibility in ancillary service provision, thus en-
hancing net load following capability [13].
Nevertheless, three important issues arising from increased VER penetration still
need to be resolved. First, power and reserve products are variously defined and
compensated across the different energy regions; see, e.g., [11]. This lack of stan-
dardization makes it difficult to compare and evaluate the reliability, efficiency,and
fairness of system operations across these regions.
Second, product definitions are specified in broad rigid terms (e.g., capacity, en-
ergy, ramp-rate, regulation, non-spinning reserve). These rigid categorizations do
not permit resources to be further differentiated and compensated on the basis of
additional valuable flexibility in service provision, such as an ability to ramp up and
down between minimum and maximum values over very short time intervals.
Moreover, the valued services provided by energy resources in power systems
largely arise from one source: generated power paths. Since the attributes of power
paths are highly correlated, attempts to unbundle these attributes into separately
defined and priced products are conceptually problematic. For example, how can
“ramp-rate” be properly valued apart from a consideration of other power path at-
tributes, such as start time, duration, and power range?
Third, attempts to accommodate new products have led to the introduction of
out-of-market (OOM) compensation processes. In 2011 the U.S. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order 755 to address OOM payment prob-
lems for one particular product category in U.S. centrally-managed wholesale power
markets: namely, regulation with different abilities to follow electronic dispatch sig-
nals with high accuracy [12]. However, given its limited scope, Order 755 does not
fully eliminate the need in these markets to resort to OOM processes. As stressed
in [4], the additional complexity resulting from OOM compensation processes pro-
vides increased opportunities for market participants to gain unfair profit advantages
through strategic behaviors.
A group of researchers has been working to develop a new swing-contract market
design for electric power systems that permits greater flexibility in service provision
while at the same time addressing the above three issues [15, 22]. This work builds
on important earlier work [2, 3, 8, 19] that stresses the relevance of options and
two-part pricing contracts for electricity transactions.
The swing contract (SC) proposed in [15, 22] permits a resource with dispatch-
able power to offer into an electric power market a collection of available power
paths with a wide range of specified services, such as start-location, start-time,
power level, ramp rate, duration, and volt/VAr support. Each of these services can
be offered as a range of values rather than as a point value, thus permitting greater
flexibility in real-time implementation to meet both power and reserve needs. More-
over, permitting the resource to offer its services into the market in bundled form, as
a collection of available power paths, helps to ensure that all of its valued services
receive appropriate compensation.
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Simple examples are used in [15, 22] to illustrate how the trading of SCs could be
supported by a sequence of linked centrally-managed forward markets in a manner
that permits efficient real-time balancing of net load subject to system and reserve-
requirement constraints. In comparison with existing wholesale electric power mar-
ket designs, the following key policy implications of this SC market design are
highlighted.
• permits full market-based compensation for availability and performance
• facilitates a level playing field for market participation
• facilitates co-optimization of power and reserve markets
• supports forward-market trading of power and reserve
• permits service providers to offer flexible service availability
• provides system operators with real-time flexibility in service usage
• facilitates accurate load forecasting and following of dispatch signals
• permits resources to internally manage unit commitment and capacity constraints
• permits the robust-control management of uncertain net load
• eliminates the need for out-of-market payment adjustments
• reduces the complexity of market rules
Left unresolved in this previous conceptual work, however, is whether the deter-
mination of optimal market-clearing solutions for SCs can be reduced to a routine
operation suitable for real-world application. The present study provides an affirma-
tive answer to this question for a general SC day-ahead market design permitting
swing contracts to be offered by any dispatchable resource.1
Section 2 presents and motivates an illustrative form of SC permitting the flexible
provision of power and reserve services in electric power markets. The basic opera-
tional features of existing U.S. day-ahead and real-time market designs are outlined
in Section 3. Section 4 discusses in broad terms a new market design for the support
of SC trading, with a particular focus on a centrally-managed SC day-ahead market
design that permits SCs to be offered by any dispatchable resource. Key distinc-
tions between this SC day-ahead market design and existing U.S. day-ahead market
designs are highlighted.
Section 5 then presents a new optimization formulation for the market clearing of
SCs in the SC day-ahead market. This formulation constitutes a mixed integer linear
programming (MILP) problem that can be solved by means of the same MILP so-
lution software currently in use for standard security-constrained unit commitment
optimization formulations [6, 14, 20, 24]. A numerical example is provided in Sec-
tion 6 to demonstrate the practical feasibility of this new optimization formulation.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 7. A nomenclature table listing symbols
and symbol definitions is provided in an appendix.
1 The present study is a substantial extension of an earlier preliminary study [17] by the authors
appearing in an electronic conference proceedings.
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2 An Illustrative Swing Contract in Firm Form
Four types of contracts are proposed in [15] to facilitate power and reserve trading:
namely, firm contracts and option contracts taking either a fixed or swing form. A
firm contract (FC) imposes specific obligations on the buyer and seller regarding
how the buyer will procure services from the seller in accordance with contractually
specified terms. In contrast, an option contract (OC) gives the buyer the right, but not
the obligation, to procure services from the seller in accordance with contractually
specified terms. The right can be activated by exercise of the OC at a contractually
permitted exercise time, at which point the contractual terms of the OC become firm.
An FC or OC is a fixed contract if each of its offered services is expressed as
a single value. An FC or OC is a swing contract (SC) if at least one of its offered
services is expressed as a set of possible values, thus permitting some degree of
flexibility in its implementation.
For concreteness, this study focuses on SCs in firm form that offer a particular
spectrum of services expressed in time-domain terms.2 The form of these SCs is as
follows:
SC = [b, ts, te,P,R,φ ] (1)
b = location where service delivery is to occur;
ts = power delivery start time;
te = power delivery end time;
P = [Pmin, Pmax] = range of power levels p;
R = [−RD, RU ] = range of down/up ramp rates r;
φ = Performance payment method for real-time services.
In (1), the location b would typically refer to a bus or node of a transmission
grid. The times ts and te denote specific calendar times expressed at the granularity
of time periods of length ∆ t (e.g., 1 hour, 1 minute), with ts < te. The power interval
bounds Pmin ≤ Pmax can represent pure power injections (if 0 ≤ Pmin), pure power
withdrawals or absorptions (if Pmax ≤ 0), or bi-directional power capabilities (if
Pmin ≤ 0 ≤ Pmax). The down/up limits −RD and RU for the ramp rates r (MW/∆ t)
are assumed to satisfy −RD ≤ 0≤ RU .
The location b, the start time ts, and the end time te are all specified as single
values in (1). However, the power levels p and the down/up ramp rates r are specified
in swing form with associated rangesP andR.
The performance payment method φ designates the mode of ex post compensa-
tion to be paid to the seller of the SC if this seller is called upon to provide actual
services. This performance payment method can take a wide variety of forms.
2 As stressed in [1], the services extracted from resources can alternatively be expressed in terms
of their frequency bandwidth characteristics. The general concept of a swing contract does not
depend on the exact manner in which services are characterized.
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For example, φ could be a flat-rate price ($/MWh) to be applied to the total
amount of energy (MWh) injected into the grid between ts and te. Alternatively, φ
could specify that the price ($/MWh) to be paid for power (MW) injected into the
grid between ts and te is contingent on the realization of some future event, such as
the spot price of fuel between ts and te. Also, φ might include a metric for the com-
pensation of ramping, such as some form of “mileage” metric based on the length
of any delivered down/up power path.3 In addition, φ could include penalty or in-
centive payments to encourage accurate following of dispatch instructions between
ts and te, thus permitting a market-based determination of these payments.4
To understand the obligations of the seller and buyer of an SC (1), should it be
cleared, a numerical example might be helpful. Consider the following SC offered
for sale in an ISO-managed day-ahead market by a market participant m in return
for a requested availability price α = $100,5 where ∆ t = 1 hour.
b = bus b;
ts = 8:00am;
te = 10:00am;
P = [Pmin, Pmax] = [10MW, 40MW];
R = [−RD, RU ] = [-38MW/h, 28MW/h];
φ = $35/MWh.
This SC implies that market participant m is offering to provide power at bus b
from 8:00am to 10:00am on the following day. The power levels at which m is will-
ing to be dispatched range from 10MW to 40MW, but the required down/up ramp
rates r to achieve these power levels must satisfy -38MW/h≤ r≤ 28MW/h. The per-
formance payment method φ designates that m is to be paid the price φ=$35/MWh
for each MWh of energy it delivers under this SC.
Suppose the ISO announces that this SC has been cleared. The seller m is then
immediately entitled to receive its availability price α = $100. In return for this
payment, m is “committed” for next-day operations in the following sense: m is
obligated to ensure it will be available to perform the services promised in its cleared
3 For example, CAISO defines the mileage of a planned power path for a dispatchable resource to
be the summation of the absolute changes in the successive automated generation control (AGC)
set points that are used to communicate power dispatch instructions to this resource [5].
4 Current penalties for failure to follow dispatch instructions are administratively determined. For
example, CAISO uses a comparison of AGC set points to actual telemetry in order to judge the
accuracy with which dispatch instructions have been followed. It then adjusts mileage payments
when a resource fails to provide the power movements called for by dispatch instructions [5].
5 The availability price α requested by the seller of an SC, i.e., the SC’s offer price, is not con-
sidered to be part of the SC itself. In economics, physical commodities (e.g., apples) are consid-
ered separately from their offer prices. Similarly, standardized financial contracts (e.g., bonds) are
treated as commodities that can be purchased in various market settings at possibly varying of-
fer prices. In principle, this separation between a commodity/contract and its offer price facilitates
price competition among commodity/contract sellers, thus increasing the likelihood that prices will
be driven to efficient levels. See [21] for further discussion of this point.
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SC if called upon to do so in next-day operations between 8:00am and 10:00am. In
turn, the ISO is obligated to ensure that m is compensated fully, ex post, for any
such service performance, in accordance with m’s performance payment method φ .
Figure 1 depicts one possible power path that the ISO could dispatch in real-time
operations, in accordance with the terms of this SC. The darker (green) area under
this power path is the resulting energy (MWh) delivery, to be compensated ex post
at the rate of $35/MWh.
Fig. 1 A possible dispatched power path for the SC numerical example.
It is the responsibility of market participant m to ensure it is able to fulfill the
terms of this offered SC. Two aspects must be considered: physical feasibility; and
financial feasibility. With regard to physical feasibility, the power delivery start time
ts=8:00am must precede the power delivery end time te=10:00am, which is clearly
the case. In addition, [te−ts] = 2h must be at least as great as m’s minimum up time.6
With regard to financial feasibility, market participant m should make sure that
all of its “avoidable costs” are covered. Avoidable costs are costs that can be avoided
if an activity is not undertaken but that are incurred if it is undertaken.
Specifically, market participant m should make sure that its offered availability
price α = $100 covers all of the avoidable costs that m would have to pay in order
to guarantee service availability. Also, m should make sure that its offered perfor-
mance payment price φ = $35/MWh is sufficient to cover all avoidable costs that
m would have to pay if called upon to perform actual services. Examples of avoid-
able service availability costs include avoidable unit commitment (UC) costs, such
as start-up/shut-down and no-load costs, as well as lost-opportunity costs arising
from m’s inability to receive revenues for its services in a next-best alternative use.
Examples of avoidable service performance costs include avoidable costs for fuel
and labor time.
6 To help ensure the physical feasibility of offered SCs, an ISO might want to require all offered
SCs to include in their performance payment methods some type of standardized failure-to-perform
penalties. The severity of these penalties could be conditioned on the severity of past and current
transgressions.
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3 Existing U.S. Wholesale Power Market Designs
As depicted in Fig. 2, seven U.S. energy regions (CAISO, ERCOT, ISO-NE, MISO,
NYISO, PJM, SPP) encompassing over 60% of U.S. generation capacity currently
have centrally-managed wholesale power markets.7 Although specific market rules
differ across these seven energy regions, particularly with regard to reserve procure-
ment, their basic operational design can be roughly summarized as follows.
Fig. 2 Energy regions in North America that have ISO/RTO-managed wholesale power markets.
Public domain source: [9].
Private Generation Companies (GenCos) sell bulk power to other private compa-
nies called Load-Serving Entities (LSEs), who in turn resell this power to retail cus-
tomers. The transactions between the GenCos and LSEs take place within a whole-
sale power market consisting of a Day-Ahead Market (DAM) and a Real-Time Mar-
ket (RTM), operating in parallel, which are centrally managed by an Independent
System Operator (ISO) or Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). Day-ahead
generation schedules are determined in the DAM based on estimated next-day net
loads. Any discrepancies that arise between DAM generation schedules for next-
day operations and actual next-day needs for generation based on actual next-day
net loads are handled in the RTM, which thus functions as a real-time balancing
mechanism.8
7 For background readings on current U.S. wholesale power market operations pertinent for issues
raised in the current study, see [7], [10], [16], [18], and [23].
8 A GenCo is an entity that produces (supplies) power for an electric power grid. The term load is
used in two senses: (i) to refer to an entity that consumes (absorbs) power from an electric power
grid; and (ii) to refer to the power demands of such entities. The term net load is defined to be power
demand net of non-dispatchable generation, such as wind or solar power. An LSE is an entity
that secures power, transmission, and related services at the wholesale level in order to service
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The physical power flows underlying these transactions take place by means of
a high-voltage transmission grid that remains centrally managed by the ISO/RTO in
order to ensure open access at reasonable access rates. Transmission grid congestion
is managed in the DAM and RTM by Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP).9
During the morning of each day d the GenCos and LSEs submit into the DAM
a collection of power supply offers and power demand bids, respectively, for all
24 hours h of day d+1. Given these offers and bids, the ISO/RTO solves Security-
Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC) and Security-Constrained Economic Dis-
patch (SCED) optimization problems subject to standard system constraints10 in or-
der to determine the following planned outcomes at each transmission grid bus b for
each hour h of day d+1: (i) GenCo unit commitments; (ii) scheduled dispatch levels
(MW) for committed GenCos; and (iii) a locational marginal price piDAM(b,h,d)
($/MWh). A committed GenCo located at bus b is paid piDAM(b,h,d) for each MW
of power it is scheduled to inject at b during hour h of day d+1, and an LSE must pay
piDAM(b,h,d) for each MW of power its retail customers are scheduled to withdraw
at bus b during hour h of day d+1.
The ISO/RTO undertakes an RTM SCED optimization at least once every five
minutes during each day d. At the start of an RTM SCED on any day d, immediately
prior to some operating period t, the ISO/RTO forecasts the net load for t. The
ISO/RTO then conducts the RTM SCED optimization to resolve any discrepancies
between the dispatch schedule determined in the day-(d-1) DAM for t on day d and
the ISO/RTO’s current forecasted net load for t on day d. Any dispatch adjustment
and/or load curtailment needed to ensure load balancing at a particular bus b for
operating period t on day d is settled at the LMP determined for bus b in the RTM
SCED optimization conducted for operating period t on day d.
For later purposes, four key features of this existing wholesale power market
design need to be stressed. First, the design does not provide for the coverage of
UC costs through market-based processes. Rather, start-up/shut-down, no-load, and
other forms of UC costs incurred by GenCos are compensated by various forms of
out-of-market (OOM) payments, generally referred to as uplift payments.
Second, DAM/RTM settlements (including uplift payments) do not carefully dis-
tinguish between avoidable costs and unavoidable (sunk) costs. All of the avoid-
able costs incurred by DAM/RTM market participants due to their fulfillment of
DAM/RTM service obligations should be compensated through DAM/RTM settle-
ments. However, the unavoidable costs of these participants – i.e., the costs they
the load (power demands) of its retail customers. An ISO/RTO is an organization charged with
the primary responsibility of maintaining the security of an electric power system and often with
system operation responsibilities as well. The ISO/RTO is required to be independent, meaning it
cannot have a conflict of interest in carrying out these responsibilities, such as an ownership stake
in generation or transmission facilities within the power system.
9 LMP is the pricing of electric power according to the timing and location of its withdrawal from,
or injection into, an electric power grid.
10 These system constraints include: power balance constraints; line and generation capacity limits;
down/up ramping restrictions; minimum down/up-time requirements, and reserve requirements.
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would incur whether or not they participated in the DAM/RTM – should not be
compensated through DAM/RTM settlements.
Third, settlement obligations for scheduled next-day service performance are in-
curred in the DAM in advance of actual service performance. These DAM settle-
ment obligations are based on DAM net load estimates formed from LSE demand
bids and from ISO/RTO forecasts for next-day non-dispatchable generation. Thus,
subsequent RTM dispatch and settlement adjustments are typically needed in order
to balance actual next-day net loads. Having multiple points in time (DAM, RTM)
at which settlement obligations are incurred for the same operating period increases
the chance that market inefficiency (deadweight loss) will arise.
Fourth, considered together, the above three features result in extremely complex
market rules. This, in turn, opens up opportunities for market gaming.
4 The SC DAM Design: Overview
As discussed in [15, 22], swing contract (SC) trading can be supported by a sequence
of linked centrally-managed forward markets whose planning horizons range from
years to minutes. Forward markets with very long planning horizons can be used to
encourage new capacity investment while forward markets with very short planning
horizons can be used to correct last-minute imbalances between available generation
and forecasted real-time net loads.
In this study, for concreteness, we demonstrate how an ISO-managed SC DAM
can be designed that permits SC trading by the set M of all market participants with
dispatchable resources. The entities inM can include GenCos, demand response re-
sources (DRRs),11 electric storage devices (ESDs), and dispatchable variable energy
resources (VERs). Additional market participants include non-dispatchable VERs
and LSEs with fixed (must-serve) loads.
To retain the ISO’s non-profit status, all costs incurred by the ISO for SC pro-
curement must be passed through to market participants. This cost pass-through
could simply require all procurement costs to be allocated to the LSEs in proportion
to their share of real-time loads. However, the presence of performance payment
methods φ in offered SCs permits more sophisticated cost-sharing arrangements.
For example, reserve requirement costs could arise in part due to the inability of
some resources with cleared SCs to follow dispatch instructions with high accuracy.
The ISO could require standardized failure-to-perform penalties to be included in
the performance payment methods of SCs to help defray these costs.
Figure 3 provides a summary comparison of our proposed SC DAM design to
current DAM designs. The basic features characterizing current DAM designs are
11 An example of a DRR would be an entity that manages a collection of distributed energy re-
sources (DERs), such as household appliances. Even if individual DERs have relatively small
amounts of down/up flexibility in their power usage due to local goals and constraints, a suffi-
ciently large collection of these DERs could permit the extraction of down/up demand response
services with substantial flexibility.
10 Wanning Li and Leigh Tesfatsion
Fig. 3 Comparison of the SC DAM design with current DAM designs.
explained in Section 3. To understand the similarities and differences highlighted
in Fig. 3, it is important to recall the key attributes of SCs discussed in Section 2.
These key attributes are summarized below.
(i) The swing in the contractual terms of SCs permits these contracts to function as
both power and reserve products. This eliminates the need to provide separate
pricing and settlement processes for power versus reserve services.
(ii) The two-part pricing of SCs permits full separate market-based compensation for
service availability and service performance. The availability price of an SC per-
mits the seller to be compensated for all avoidable costs associated with service
availability, while the performance payment method included among the terms of
an SC permits the seller to be compensated ex post for all avoidable costs arising
from actual real-time service provision.
(iii) SCs require sellers to internally manage unit commitment and generation capac-
ity constraints for their resources. By offering an SC into an SC DAM, a seller is
communicating to the ISO in charge of this SC DAM that it can feasibly perform
the services represented in the SC if called upon to do so.
(iv) The performance payment method φ included among the contractual terms of an
SC can designate special incentives and/or penalties to assure the ISO that the
seller of the SC will fulfill the terms of the SC if the SC is cleared.
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5 The SC DAM Design: Analytical Formulation
5.1 SC DAM Analytical Formulation: Summary Description
As discussed in Section 3, current DAM designs rely on standard SCUC/SCED
optimizations to determine unit commitment, economic dispatch, and pricing solu-
tions. In a sharp break from this practice, we propose a new analytical optimization
formulation for the SC DAM that permits the optimal clearing of SCs.
Fig. 4 Comparison of the SC DAM optimization formulation with current SCUC/SCED DAM
optimization formulations.
Figure 4 highlights key distinctions between our proposed optimization formula-
tion for the SC DAM and traditional SCUC/SCED optimization formulations. Sec-
tion 5.2 clarifies these distinctions by setting out our proposed SC DAM optimiza-
tion formulation in concrete equation form.
5.2 SC DAM Analytical Formulation: Equations
Consider an ISO-managed SC DAM to be optimally cleared over a setT = {1, . . . ,T}
of successive next-day operating periods t with length ∆ t. For clarity of exposition,
five assumptions are made.
First, it is assumed that all loads serviced by the LSEs are fixed (must-serve)
loads that do not provide dispatchable services. Second, it is assumed that LSE
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demand bids have a simple block-energy form, i.e., an LSE’s demand bid for any
given period t consists of a power demand (MW) that is not responsive to price.
Third, it is assumed that each market participant m with dispatchable resources, i.e.,
each m∈M, offers a single swing contract SCm into the SC DAM, where SCm takes
form (1).12 Fourth, it is assumed that the performance payment method φm appearing
within SCm takes the form of a collection of flat-rate energy prices φm(t) ($/MW∆ t),
one price for each t ∈T. Fifth, it is assumed that only system-wide down/up spinning
reserve requirements are imposed; contingency reserve requirements for generator
or line outages are not considered.13
Given these simplifications, the objective of the ISO managing the SC DAM re-
duces to the minimization of total cost ($) over T subject to system constraints. Total
cost is the summation of SC availability cost plus expected performance cost arising
from the need to balance expected net loads {NLb(t) : b ∈ B, t ∈ T} as determined
by LSE demand bids and ISO-forecasted generation from non-dispatchable VERs.
Total cost is expressible as follows:14
∑
m∈M
αmcm+∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
φm(t)|pm(t)|∆ t (2)
The ISO minimizes (2) by appropriate selection of the following ISO decision
variables:
• Market participant contract clearing indicators:
cm ∈ {0,1}, ∀m ∈M
• Market participant power dispatch levels:
pm(t), ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T
• Bus voltage angles:
θb(t), ∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T
The system constraints for the minimization of (2) are as follows:
ISO decision variable bounds:
cm ∈ {0,1} , ∀m ∈M (3)
−pi ≤ θb(t)≤ pi , ∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T (4)
12 See [15] for a discussion of the more general case in which offers can take the form of portfolios
consisting of multiple SCs.
13 As discussed in [15], option SCs seem to be a more suitable vehicle than firm SCs for handling
contingency reserve requirements.
14 See the appendix nomenclature table for definitions of all terms appearing in the following
equations. Although power levels pm(t) for all market participants m ∈M nominally appear in the
objective function (2), it will be seen below that the constraints for this SC DAM optimization
formulation restrict the power amounts for market participants with non-cleared SCs to be zero.
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Unit commitment constraints:
vm(t) = cm ·Am(t), ∀ m ∈M, t ∈ T (5)
Voltage angle specification at angle reference bus 1:
θ1(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ T (6)
Line power transmission constraints:
w`(t) = SoB(`)
[
θO(`)(t)−θE(`)(t)
]
, ∀` ∈ L, t ∈ T (7)
−Fmax` ≤ w`(t)≤ Fmax` , ∀` ∈ L, t ∈ T (8)
Power balance constraints at each bus:
∑
m∈Mb
pm(t)+ ∑
`∈LE(b)
w`(t) = NLb(t)+ ∑
`∈LO(b)
w`(t),
∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T (9)
Market participant capacity constraints:
pm(t)≤ pm(t)≤ p¯m(t), ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T (10)
p¯m(t)≤ Pmaxm vm(t), ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T (11)
pm(t)≥ Pminm vm(t), ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T (12)
Market participant down/up ramp constraints:
p¯m(t)− pm(t−1)≤ RUm∆ tvm(t−1)+Pmaxm [1− vm(t−1)],
∀m ∈M, ∀t = 2, · · · ,T (13)
pm(t−1)− pm(t)≤ RDm∆ tvm(t)+Pmaxm [1− vm(t)],
∀m ∈M, ∀t = 2, · · · ,T (14)
System-wide down/up spinning reserve requirement constraints:
∑
m∈M
pm(t)≥ ∑
b∈B
NLb(t)+RRU (t), ∀t ∈ T (15)
∑
m∈M
pm(t)≤ ∑
b∈B
NLb(t)−RRD(t), ∀t ∈ T (16)
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5.3 More Detailed Explanations of Key Terms
The absolute value terms |pm(t)| appear in the objective function (2) because a mar-
ket participant m with dispatchable resources might be called upon to provide power
curtailments pm(t)< 0 as well as power injections pm(t)> 0 in support of period-t
net load balancing requirements. The power curtailments provided by m are as-
sumed to be compensated at the same flat rate φm(t) as m’s power injections.15
The contract clearing indicator cm ∈ {0,1} indicates whether SCm has been
cleared (1) or not (0). The offer service indicator Am(t) ∈ {0,1} indicates whether
time period t is (1) or is not (0) within the contract service times covered by SCm.
Note that Am(t) is a derived value, calculated by the ISO from the information
provided within SCm. Consider, for example, the numerical SC example presented
in Section 2. In this example, a market participant m submits an SC consisting of
an offer to provide service between 8:00am and 10:00am during the following day.
Thus:
Am(t) =
{
1 if t = 8, 9
0 if t = 1, . . . , 7, 10, . . . , 24
As seen in Section 5.2, the unit commitment constraints take the form
vm(t) = cm ·Am(t), ∀ m ∈M, t ∈ T (17)
The unit commitment vm(t)∈ {0,1} for each market participant m∈M in each time
period t is thus determined by two factors:
(a) Has SCm been cleared by the ISO or not?
(b) Does SCm include service for time period t or not?
The contract clearing indicator cm ∈ {0,1} represents condition (a), and the offer
service indicator Am(t) ∈ {0,1} represents condition (b). If conditions (a) and (b)
are both met, then m is available to provide service in time period t. Otherwise, if
at most one of these conditions is met, m is not available to provide service in time
period t.
The market participant capacity constraints take the form
pm(t)≤ pm(t)≤ p¯m(t), ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T (18)
p¯m(t)≤ Pmaxm vm(t), ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T (19)
pm(t)≥ Pminm vm(t), ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T (20)
15 The absolute value terms |pm(t)| in the objective function (2) do not pose any computational
difficulty. Because the goal is to minimize this objective function, these absolute value terms can
equivalently be represented in terms of linear inequality constraints, as follows. First, introduce
new decision variables for the ISO: pam(t),∀m ∈M, t ∈ T. Second, in the objective function (2),
replace |pm(t)| by pam(t), ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T. Third, include the following additional linear inequality
constraints in the constraint set: pam ≥ pm and pam ≥ −pm , ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T. Any solution for the
resulting constrained minimization problem will then require pam(t) = |pm(t)|, ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T.
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Also, the market participant down/up ramp constraints take the form
p¯m(t)− pm(t−1)≤ RUm∆ tvm(t−1)+Pmaxm [1− vm(t−1)],
∀m ∈M, ∀t = 2, · · · ,T (21)
pm(t−1)− pm(t)≤ RDm∆ tvm(t)+Pmaxm [1− vm(t)], (22)
∀m ∈M, ∀t = 2, · · · ,T (23)
The terms pm(t) and p¯m(t) appearing in constraints (18) through (23) are derived
values; they give the run-time lower and upper bounds on down/up power availabil-
ity from market participant m ∈M in each time period t = 2, . . . ,T as a function of
the ISO’s unit commitment decisions vm(t−1) and vm(t).
To see this, note from (18)-(20) that vm(t) = 0 implies pm(t) = 0 for each t ∈ T.
Also, the binary unit commitment vector (vm(t − 1),vm(t)) can take on only one
of four possible value combinations for t = 2, . . . ,T : namely, (0,0), (1,0), (0,1), or
(1,1). Given each of these four possible value combinations, it is straightforward
to show that constraints (18) through (23) reduce to a distinct set of restrictions on
(pm(t), p¯m(t)) for t = 2, . . . ,T , as indicated in Table 1.
Table 1 Min/max available power output from m under different unit commitment combinations.
vm(t) 0 0 1 1
vm(t−1) 0 1 0 1
p¯m(t) 0 0 p¯m(t)≤ Pmaxm p¯m(t)≤ P
max
m
p¯m(t)≤ pm(t−1)+RUm∆ t
pm(t) 0 0 pm(t)≥ Pminm
pm(t)≥ Pminm
pm(t)≥ pm(t−1)−RDm∆ t
Finally, it is interesting to note that an “inherent reserve range” can be derived
for the power system in each time period t, as a function of the solution for the SC
DAM optimization. Define
RRmax(t) = ∑
m∈M
pm(t), ∀t ∈ T (24)
RRmin(t) = ∑
m∈M
pm(t), ∀t ∈ T (25)
By construction, the MW amounts RRmax(t) and RRmin(t) are the maximum and
minimum amounts of power available for the system in each time period t during
implementation of the SC DAM optimization solution. The Inherent Reserve Range
(IRR) for time period t thus takes the form
IRR(t) = [RRmin(t),RRmax(t) ] . (26)
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5.4 Size Comparison with Standard DAM SCUC Formulations
As noted in Section 3, two optimizations are undertaken in current U.S. ISO/RTO-
managed DAMs to determine unit commitment, economic dispatch, and pricing
solutions: namely, Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC) and Security-
Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED). SCUC is formulated as a mixed integer
linear programming (MILP) problem and SCED is formulated as a linear program-
ming problem.
Instead of conducting two optimizations, our proposed new SC DAM optimiza-
tion uses a single optimization process to determine which SCs are cleared, hence
which dispatchable market participants are obligated (committed) to ensure service
availability for the following day. As seen in Section 5.2, this SC DAM optimization
is formulated as an MILP problem.
The sizes of the standard DAM SCUC MILP problem and the SC DAM MILP
problem can be approximately measured by the number of integer decision vari-
ables and constraints in their problem formulations. To permit direct comparisons,
suppose the current day is d and the planning horizon for each problem consists of
all 24 hours h of day d+1.
Consider, first, the relative number of integer decision variables. For the DAM
SCUC MILP problem, the ISO has 24 integer decision variables (unit commitment
indicators) for each market participant m with dispatchable resources, one for each
hour h of day d+1. In contrast, for the SC DAM MILP problem, the ISO has one
integer decision variable (contract clearing indicator) for each market participant m
with dispatchable resources that covers the entire 24 hours of day d+1.
Now consider the relative number of constraints. For the standard DAM SCUC
MILP problem, unit commitment restrictions (e.g., start-up/shut-down, minimum
down/up time) must be included among the MILP problem constraints. In contrast,
for the SC DAM MILP problem, each market participant m is responsible for en-
suring the physical feasibility of SCm, its offered swing contract, which requires in
particular that all services offered in SCm must satisfy m’s unit commitment restric-
tions. Thus, unit commitment restrictions are implicitly imposed through the forms
of the submitted SCs; they do not appear among the MILP problem constraints.
Consequently, measured in terms of integer decision variables and numbers of
constraints, the size of the SC DAM optimization formulation is smaller than the
size of the standard DAM SCUC optimization formulation, substantially so if the
number of dispatchable market participants is large.
6 Illustrative Example
This section reports illustrative SC DAM optimization findings for a simple power
system with three dispatchable GenCos and no transmission congestion. Each
GenCo m submits one swing contract SCm to the ISO-managed SC DAM, as de-
picted in Table 2.
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Table 2 SCs submitted by the three GenCos in the illustrative example.
GenCo Service Period Power Range Ramp Rate Range Performance Price Availability Price
[ts, te] [Pmin,Pmax] (MW) [−RD,RU ] (MW/h) φ ($/MWh) α ($)
1 [1, 24] [0, 80] [-60, 60] 25 1500
2 [1, 24] [0, 200] [-30, 30] 10 2000
3 [8, 24] [0, 120] [-50, 50] 20 1000
Time periods t are measured in hours, and the net load NL(t) for each hour t
of the following day is as depicted in Fig. 5. The system-wide down/up spinning
reserve requirements are set at 10MW below/above net load for each hour t, i.e.,
RRD(t) = RRU (t) = 10MW for each hour t.
Fig. 5 24-hour net load profile for the illustrative example.
The ISO applies an MILP solver to determine an SC DAM optimization solution
for the following day, conditional on the three submitted SCs. Simulation results
show that the SCs submitted by GenCo 2 and GenCo 3 are cleared: i.e., cm1 = 0, cm2
= 1, and cm3 = 1. The optimal unit commitment vm(t) and dispatch level pm(t) for
each GenCo m in each hour t are shown in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
The DAM prices for the cleared SCs are their submitted availability prices, and
the payments to be received for any actual services performed under these SCs the
following day are based on the energy prices specified by the cleared SC perfor-
mance payment methods: that is, φm2 = $10/MWh and φm3 = $20/MWh.
The results show that GenCo 2 serves as base load due to its relatively low per-
formance price, similar to a coal or nuclear plant. The reasons why GenCo 3’s sub-
mitted SC is also cleared are as follows. First, there is a big ramp-up in net load
from hour 15 to hour 16. Due to GenCo 2’s limited ramp capability, the maximum
available power output for GenCo 2 at hour 16 is 160MW. Thus, GenCo 3 is cleared
although it is relatively more expensive. Second, the net load for hour 18 is 210MW,
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Table 3 Optimal SC DAM unit commitments for the illustrative example.
GenCo Periods1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 4 Optimal SC DAM dispatch schedule (MWs) for the illustrative example.
GenCo Periods1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 100 90 90 100 100 110 130 140 150 170 170 160 150 140 130 160 190 200 180 170 150 130 120 110
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0
which exceeds GenCo 2’s upper output limit 200MW. Thus, GenCo 3 is needed to
provide additional power.
Although GenCo 3’s available power is not used until hour 16, the unit com-
mitment for GenCo 3 in fact spans from hour 8 to hour 24. The reason for this is
that GenCo ’s SC commits this GenCo to be available to provide power from hour 8
through hour 24. Thus, if the ISO clears the contract, GenCo 3 must be synchronized
to the grid during each of these hours.16
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Fig. 6 Comparison of the 24-hour inherent reserve range IRR = [RRmin,RRmax] depicted by solid
lines with the 24-hour down/up spinning reserve requirements RRD and RRU depicted by dashed
lines.
16 As in any market, increased competition among SC providers should reduce the need of an ISO
to clear SCs that entail excess resource availability.
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Figure 6 depicts the inherent reserve range resulting from the cleared SCs for
GenCo 2 and GenCo 3, together with the down/up spinning reserve requirements.
Note that the inherent reserve range satisfies the down/up spinning reserve require-
ments while at the same time providing valuable additional flexibility to the ISO for
use in real-time balancing operations.
7 Conclusion
A new mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) optimization formulation has
been developed for an ISO-managed day-ahead market (DAM) based on swing con-
tracting that could facilitate the flexible provision and efficient pricing of power and
reserve services. A limitation of the current study is that we have not yet imple-
mented and tested our proposed new SC market design for large-scale systems, or
for systems involving a DAM and a real-time market (RTM) operating in parallel.
In future work we will extend our SC market design formulation to encompass
combined DAM/RTM operations, and we will undertake systematic feasibility and
cost comparisons with existing DAM/RTM operations. We will also explore the
potential of swing contracts, offered into wholesale power markets by managers of
distributed energy resources, to facilitate the integrated operation of transmission
and distribution systems.
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Appendix
Table 5 Nomenclature table listing symbols and symbol descriptions.
Symbol Description
Sets and Intervals:
B Set of bus indices b
L⊂ B×B Set of transmission line indices `
LO(b) ⊂ L Subset of lines ` originating at bus b
LE(b) ⊂ L Subset of lines ` ending at bus b
M Set of indices m for market participants with dispatchable resources
Mb ⊂M Market participants at bus b with dispatchable resources
P Interval of power levels p offered in a swing contract
R Interval of ramp rates r offered in a swing contract
T Set of time period indices t = 1, . . . ,T
Parameters and Functions:
Am(t) 1 if m in time period t is within its contract service period; 0 otherwise
B(`) Inverse of reactance (pu) for line `
E(`) End bus for line `
Fmax` Power limit (MW) for line `
NLb(t) Net load (MW) at bus b in time period t
O(`) Originating bus for line `
Pminm Lower power limit (MW) of m
Pmaxm Upper power limit (MW) of m
RDm Ramp-down limit (MW/∆ t) of m
RUm Ramp-up limit (MW/∆ t) of m
RRD(t) System-wide down spinning reserve requirement (MW) in time period t
RRU (t) System-wide up spinning reserve requirement (MW) in time period t
So Positive base power (in three-phase MVA)
te Power delivery end time offered in a swing contract
ts Power delivery start time offered in a swing contract
∆ t Time-period length
αm Availability price ($) requested by m for a swing contract
that offers service availability
φ Performance payment method for real-time service offered in a swing contract
φm(t) Energy price ($/MW∆ t) used in illustrative SC examples as a simple form
of performance payment method for the compensation of real-time down/up
power services performed by a market participant m
SC DAM Optimization Variables:
cm 1 if the swing contract offered by m is cleared; 0 otherwise
vm(t) 1 if m is online in time period t; 0 otherwise
pm(t) Power output (MW) of m in time period t
pm(t) Maximum available power output (MW) of m in time period t
pm(t) Minimum available power output (MW) of m in time period t
θb(t) Voltage angle (radians) at bus b in time period t
w`(t) Line power (MW) for line ` in time period t
